



for Research on the
Technology
Side Payments in Marketing
John R. Hauser *
Duncan I. Simester **
Birger Wernerfelt *
September 1996 WP # 161-97
Sloan WP # 3950
* MIT Sloan School of Management
** Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
© 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
38 Memorial Drive, E56-390
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307





John R. Hauser is the Kirin Professor of Marketing, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan
School of Management, 38 Memorial Drive, E56-314, Cambridge, MA 02142, (617) 253-2929, (617)
258-7597 fax. Duncan I. Simester is an Assistant Professor of Marketing, University of Chicago,
Graduate School of Business, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637. Birger Wernerfelt is a
Professor of Marketing, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 38
Memorial Drive, E56-326, Cambridge, MA 02142.
This research was funded by the International Center for Research on the Management of Technology
(ICRMOT). It has benefitted from presentations before the member companies and, in particular,
from a two-day ICRMOT special interest conference on the "Marketing/R&D Interface" that was held
at 3M. This paper has benefitted from seminars at the Marketing Science Conference at the
University of Arizona, Duke University, the University of Florida, the University of Minnesota, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Army Soldier
Systems Laboratory. We thank Subrata Sen for many interesting suggestions and we thank a number
of anonymous colleagues and students who have spoken to us frankly about side payments in
marketing situations and in non-US cultures.
Side Payments in Marketing
Abstract
Frequent flyer awards, customer satisfaction ratings, internal sales support ratings, and other
marketing systems share the property that side payments can be used to increase ratings and/or usage.
We examine side payments in a class of systems where a downstream agent (say a sales person) rates
an upstream agent (say sales support). If the upstream agent is rewarded based on that rating, the
potential might exist for a side payment to increase the rating. Our analyses suggest that, for
continuous upstream and downstream reward systems, (1) side payments will almost always occur
and (2) the firm can design reward systems to factor out the side payments without any loss of
profits. We discuss the practicality and efficiency of such ratings-based reward systems. We extend
our analyses to implicit ratings systems and we discuss whether our analyses apply to situations where
the upstream and downstream agents work for different firms.
Motivation
Anyone with field experience in marketing or anyone who has taught a case on ethics in
marketing is aware that side payments are a common, if unspoken, practice. Among the examples
of which we are aware are:
Customer satisfaction incentives -- One major US auto firm pays a bonus of $25 to an auto
salesperson whenever the customer rates that salesperson highly on customer satisfaction. The
firm's consultants are aware that some of the $25 makes its way to customers in the form of
side payments such as gifts (candy, flowers, etc.). For more examples, see Mohl (1996).
Internal customer rating systems -- Many organizations ask internal customers (say the sales
representatives) to rate internal suppliers (say the advertising and product support managers)
on how well the internal supplier serves the internal customer (e.g., Zeithaml, Parasuraman,
and Berry 1990). In many situations, e.g, Chester (1995) and Shapira and Globerson (1983),
the reward the internal supplier receives is based on the rating the internal customer gives.
We have heard informally that internal suppliers often provide side payments to internal
customers in return for higher ratings.
Frequent flyer awards -- Travelers are given frequent flyer miles for business travel. These
miles can be considered side payments when the travelers exchange these credits for personal
travel or other awards. We are aware of examples where business travelers choose more
expensive routes in order to earn additional miles.
Buyer-seller situations -- Side payments are common as perquisites from sellers to buyers
(Murphy 1995). Borrus (1995) suggests that $45 billion in overseas sales were so affected.
Side payments, known politely as gainsharing and pejoratively as bribery, are prevalent in
marketing. Indeed, many management schools have added ethics modules to their basic marketing
courses to discuss these issues and there is much discussion of side payments in economics and law
(e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1996). Rather than address marketing side payments with moral imperatives
or philosophy, we seek to formalize one class of marketing side payments. We hope that our formal
structure clarifies the issues and suggests how such side payments affect marketing activities.'
1Our interest in this topic is scientific. Nothing in this paper should be interpreted as advocating side payments.
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We begin by focusing on one example of this class -- salesforce ratings of internal sales
support. We derive two general results and discuss how these results generalize to ratings that are
implicit rather than explicit. We then illustrate how most frequent flyer programs differ from internal
rating systems by one critical feature that modifies the managerial implications. We caution the
reader that our structure does not apply to all instances of side payments nor do our results substitute
for a moral discussion of side payments. However, we hope that the formal structure for a common
marketing situation provides valuable insight.
Formalization
For our formalization we choose an example where an upstream agent (U), say sales support,
provides goods and services to a downstream agent (D), say the salesforce. Both agents work for the
same firm. The downstream agent is asked to evaluate the upstream agent and the upstream agent
receives a reward based on that rating. The reward to sales support might be a monetary bonus, say
$1,000 times the rating, or the reward might simply be recognition and an increased chance of
promotion. The reward must have effective monetary value to U.
For this section we assume that the rating is a numerical rating, say a 7-point scale going from
"unsatisfactory" to "excellent." However, in a later section we discuss how the theory applies to more
implicit ratings. We denote this rating with r.
Naturally, the actions and efforts of the upstream and downstream agent add value to the firm.
In our formalization we call the actions that the upstream agent takes, u, and the actions that the
downstream agent takes. d. For example, u might be the time, effort, and materials needed to
produce advertising, brochures, and other sales materials, while d might be sales efforts such as travel
to clients, meetings with clients, and written proposals. If U and D do their jobs well, then the firm
makes some incremental profit which we denote with r(u,d). For example, the firm might make
incremental profit on the sales that result from the actions of U and D. We include in r(u,d) any
costs that U and D cause the firm to incur (printing and mailing the brochures, production costs, etc.),
but we do not include the incremental salaries and bonuses paid to U and D.
Accounting systems are rarely exact; incremental profits are hard for the firm to measure.
Thus, we make the realistic assumption that the firm can only estimate incremental profits. The
firm's estimate, -, is equal to true incremental profits plus zero-mean noise, e. That is, i=r(u,d)+e.
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The actions taken by the agents are likely to be perceived by the agents as onerous. For
example, the salesperson (D) might prefer chatting with his or her colleagues at the office rather than
making a difficult cold call on a new client. We denote these costs by c(u) for the upstream agent
and by c(d) for the downstream agent. (Both c, and cd are defined in monetary equivalents.)
We define profits as incremental above and beyond that which would have been obtained in
the absence of an incentive system for U and D. Finally, we make some reasonable technical
assumptions for the formal proofs.2
Evaluation and Reward System
We began studying side payments after working with the sales manager for a $2 billion dollar
organization that served both consumer and industrial markets. The Chief Executive Officer had
begun a program to increase customer satisfaction five-fold and the sales manager felt that his
salespeople needed support to achieve this effort. He was preparing to introduce a system in which
salespeople rated the support people on how well sales were supported. The sales manager had many
years of experience and was quite savvy. He was concerned that the salespeople would demand a
side payment in return for a higher rating.
We introduce some formal notation to model this situation. We denote the reward that the
upstream agent receives with v(r), an increasing function of r. We denote the reward that the
downstream agent receives with w(r, *), which depends upon the outcomes, i, that the firm observes.
(We have chosen incremental profit, but, in principle, i7 could be any noisy indicator of incremental
profit such as incremental sales and/or customer satisfaction [net of costs].) In real systems, w(r, ),
may or may not depend upon r. However, we show later that it makes sense for the firm to penalize
the downstream agent for a rating that is too high. For example, if the salesperson says that he or
she is getting "excellent" sales support, then he or she might be given a higher sales target than the
salesperson who says that he or she is getting "unsatisfactory" support. In such cases w(r, i) becomes
2Formally, we assume that profit is concave in both arguments and thrice differentiable and that the cost functions
are increasing, convex, and thrice differentiable. All functions and variables are real valued and actions are non-negative.
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a function of r. Technically, we restrict our analyses to v and w that are concave in their arguments.3
The reward functions are notable for what they do not assume. The upstream agent is paid
only on the rating and the downstream agent is paid only on a measure of incremental profits (and
perhaps the rating). The firm does not have to observe U's actions, u, or D's actions, d. This also
means that the firm does not observe the perceived costs, c(u) and cd(d).
At first glance the specifications of v and w seem to imply that the firm does not have to
know how the agents' actions affect profit. But this is not the case. In the formal analysis the firm
has to set the base salary for U and for D and the firm has to select the functions, v and w. In
principle, these base salaries and reward functions can depend upon r(u,d), c(u), cd(d), and their
derivatives. However, such knowledge is a formal requirement for almost any reward system. If the
firm wants to maximize its own profits, then it needs to know the marginal productivity of its
employees. If it pays them too much, then it has lost the opportunity for profits; if it pays them too
little, then they will leave the firm. The key managerial question is whether the ratings-based system
makes it more or less practical to select a reward system.
Our perspective is that of the sales manager to whom we spoke. His firm already had a
system for paying the salesforce and sales support. Presumably, the firm was able to determine
enough about the marginal productivity and perceived costs of its employees and was able to set their
salaries accordingly. The sales manager wanted to do better by introducing a rating system to
coordinate U and D. He needed to know whether side payments would undermine any potential gain
in profit from the rating system. He also wanted to know whether he should invest in monitoring and
punishment procedures to preclude side payments. Alternatively, he wanted to know whether he
could design a rating system under which there would be no incentives for side payments. Our
analyses seek to address his questions:
What conditions encourage side payments for higher ratings?
Do side payments decrease profits? Can the firm do as well under a system that allows side
payments as it could do under a system that precludes side payments?
Do the special characteristics of an internal rating system require more detailed knowledge
3A higher rating indicates more effort, thus v(r) is increasing in r. We also want r to be an indicator of u's effect
on r, thus we examine v's such that dw 2/auar > 0. For the formal proof we make a technical assumption that a2iv/auar
is bounded away from zero.
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about r(u,d), c,(u), and cd(d) than the existing incentive system?
By addressing his questions, we hope our analyses provide useful insight for this class of marketing
problems. We begin by stating the actions and decisions of the firm, U, and D as a formal game.
The Formal Game
We formalize the order of actions as follows: (1) The firm acts first and announces a reward
system, v and w. Based on this reward system, (2) the upstream agent acts next to select its actions,
u, if by doing so it can do better than not acting. (3) The downstream agent observes these actions,
but the firm does not. (4) Next, U and D agree on a contract for a side payment, s, and a rating, r.
Both do so anticipating what this will imply for D's actions, d, and the resulting expected profit, r.
If they can not agree on a contract, D takes no actions. (5) D announces the rating, r. (6) The
upstream agent receives its reward, v(r), based on this rating. (7) The downstream agent, D, acts in
its own best interests to choose its actions, d. (8) The firm observes its objective, , and (9) pays D
its reward, w(r,*).
Naturally, we assume that the firm will announce a reward system only if it can do better with
the actions and profits implied by the reward system than it could do in the absence of a reward
system. (Without a reward system, the agents set u and d to zero.)
Firm's Goals, Agents' Goals
We assume that the firm is risk neutral and profit maximizing. Thus, the firm will seek to
maximize the expected value of profits minus wages:
(1) expected net profit = E[i(u,d) - v(r) - w(r,f)]
We assume that both the upstream and downstream agents are risk averse and will act in their own
best interests to maximize their expected utilities, EU, and EU,,,.4 We scale perceived costs so that
4Technically, the utility functions are integrable, thrice differentiable, increasing, and concave. Because of our
previous assumptions, the expected utility function is well-behaved.
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they are measured on the same scale as profits and wages. (Please note: our mnemonic notation for
the upstream agent, U, is distinguished from the notation for expected utility, EU, by the use of
italics.) In the absence of a side payment each agent acts in his or her own best interests to maximize
the expected utility of wages minus perceived costs.
(2) upstream agent maximizes EUu[v(r) - c(u)]
downstream agent maximizes EUd[w(r,fr) - cd(d)]
The upstream agent acts first by choosing an action, u, that the downstream agent (but not
the firm) can observe. In the absence of a side payment, the downstream agent will take u as given
and act to maximize the second expression in Equation 2. This means that the downstream agent's
reaction to u implies three continuously differentiable functions, (u), d(u), and r(u), which tell us
how D would react to U's choice of actions and how expected profit would be affected if there were
no side payment.
Now consider a situation where U offers a side payment, s, to D in return for a higher rating,
r. This side payment need not be monetary but it must be valued by D and be costly for U to
provide. It might be extranormal service that is valued by D but does not affect r directly. Such
services might include fancy brochures with D's picture on the cover, sales "training" for D in Aruba,
or "warm-up" jackets with the company's logo that can be given to friends and relatives.
We model this offer as a take it or leave it offer, but we could obtain similar results for other
assumptions on how U and D share surplus, if any, from the (s,?) contract. It will be in D's interest
to accept this contract if D can do at least as well with the contract as without. Thus, D's expected
utility from the contract must be at least as large as that which D can obtain in the absence of a side
payment. This constraint defines critical values of the side payment, s(u,k), for every action, u, and
potential rating, . After accepting the contract, D will choose its actions in its own best interests.
We write d = d(u,r) for the action that D chooses in order to maximize its own expected utility. That
is, D's actions depend on U's actions and the potential rating. We define r = ir(u,r) for the resulting
profits. Formally, the implied constraint is:
(3) EUd[w(,ft) -ca( +s(u,r)] > EUd[w(, r) -cd(&]
For a -given v and w, the upstream agent will select u and to maximize its expected utility. (U's
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choices imply D's choices by Equation 3. Because U is maximizing its own well being, U will select
a side payment such that the inequality in Equation 3 is binding.) Thus, if side payments are allowed,
we modify the first line of Equation 2 to obtain:
(4) EUu[f, u] =EUu[v(r) - Cu(u) - s(u,r)]
Equations 2, 3, and 4 tell us how U and D will react to any functions, v and w, chosen by the firm.
Subject to these constraints, the firm chooses v and w to maximize the profits in Equation 1. In other
words, these equations tell us how the firm, U, and D will each act, subject to the formal game, to
maximize their own objectives (profit for the firm, expected utility for the agents).
However, to earn non-zero profits, the firm must retain its employees. Let EU and EUd be
the minimum expected utilities that U and D require to participate. We assume that these expected
utilities represent that which U and D could obtain from other options that are available, such as
working for another firm or simply coasting in their current jobs (e.g., Adams 1995). That is, we
assume that EUu and EUd are set by the market. To induce U and D to participate, the firm must set
v and w such that:
(5) EUu[v(r) -cu(i)-s(a,r)] EU
EUd[w(F,) - cd(d) +s(u,r3)] EUd
Because the firm is maximizing expected profits it will try to keep wages as low as is feasible.
Formally this means that the firm will attempt to select v and w such that the constraints implied by
Equation 5 are binding.
We now address the sales manager's first question.
Side Payments Almost Always Occurs
The upstream/downstream structure almost always guarantees side payments. By this we mean
that there are economic incentives for side payments. To preclude side payments, the sales manager
would likely have to impose an exogenous system such as a reprimand (or worse) for any perceived
impropriety. Such a monitoring and policing system could be costly to the firm.
SIDE PAYMENTS IN MARKETING
Interior Solutions
The intuition is best seen in the case where v and w imply interior solutions. In this case, in
the absence of a side payment, D will maximize the right hand side of equation 3 by setting the
derivatives to zero. That is,
(6) aEUd[w(,) C- d(d)] O
Thus, the marginal loss to D of an very small increase in r is zero. On the other hand, because U's
utility is increasing in v and v is increasing in r, U gains by having D increase r. That is,
(7) aEUjv() - Cu()] > 
Thus, intuitively there appear to be gains to trade at ? -- U gains more than D loses.
The actual proof is more complex because we have to account for the integration implied by
the expected utility operators, but the basic intuition does not change. (A formal proof is given in
an appendix that is available from the authors. [attached for review]) For any v and w chosen by the
firm such that (1) the firm makes positive profits, (2) U and D find it better to take some actions than
to take no actions, and (3) the v and w imply interior solutions, then there are economic incentives
to use side payments.
Notice that if D is not penalized for a higher rating, then aw/ar-O and equation 6 will hold
for all . There will always be gains to trade. In this case even a minimal side payment from U will
persuade D to rate U as high as is feasible. When w does not depend on r, U need not put in any
effort beyond this minimal side payment. Thus, if the firm wants to use a rating system to entice U
to put forth sufficient effort, w must be a function of r.
Constrained Ratings
The sales manager may ask D to rate U on a 7-point scale. For example, the highest rating
possible might be "excellent." For some v and w, this constraint may mean that the optimal solution
to Equation 3 (RHS) or Equation 4 is not an interior solution. In general, if r is constrained to be
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less than some upper bound, r, and this upper bound is less than that which D would otherwise
choose, then D might find it to be in its best interest to set r=r. Formally, such a constraint might
replace the equality in equation 6 with an inequality and there may be no gains to trade.
However, constraints on r do not rule out side payments. For example, Hauser, Simester, and
Wernerfelt (1996) demonstrate a linear system in which the firm's choice of v and w causes U to
provide D with a side payment in return for reporting r=r. The side payment is necessary in that
system because D can not achieve EUd without the side payment but can do so with a side payment.
No Room to Trade
There is a final situation we must consider. Suppose v increases at a slower rate than w
decreases. If this happens over the entire range, there will never be any r where there are gains to
trade. However, such a situation will not occur for a rational firm. If v increases at a slower rate
than w decreases, then the optimal response for D is to set r=O. However, this means that U will set
u=O because any actions incur perceived costs without rewards. This will, in turn, cause D to set d=O
and the firm will earn only as much with the reward system in place as it did without the reward
system in place. This violates one of our assumptions.
This covers all the cases for continuous v and w. In an appendix we prove formally that:
RESULT 1. For incentive systems in which the rewards to the upstream agent are increasing in the
downstream agent's rating, the upstream agent will provide a positive side payment to the
downstream agent unless the firm sets a binding upper bound on the rating (or otherwise precludes
side payments). Even with a binding upper bound, there may be side payments.
Side Payments Need Not Hurt the Firm's Profits
Because most ratings-based reward systems encourage side payments and because it might be
expensive to use monitoring and punishment to preclude side payments, we now address the sales
manager's second question. Do the side payments necessarily decrease the firm's profits? We want
to compare the profits from a system that precludes side payments to the profits from a system that
allows side payments. We first address whether a ratings-based system with side payments exists that
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does not decrease profits and then whether it is practical.
Let's consider the sales manager's firm. Many sales people join and leave the firm annually.
Furthermore, the sales skills are not entirely unique to the firm. In theory, in order to retain
employees and maximize profits, the firm would have needed to know the details of 7r(u,d), c(u), and
c,(d) for each and every employee. However, it is appears to have been practical for this large firm
to set base salaries and to adjust variable rewards (e.g., sales commissions) by trial and error.
Now let's assume that the firm introduces a rating system which encourages side payments.
If the previous system was inefficient, the new system might induce higher u and d and the firm will
have to reimburse the agents for their increased perceived costs. But how about the side payment?
The upstream agent will have to pay s and the downstream agent will receive s. The firm may be
aware of these side payments, but it certainly does not want to set up an accounting system to
measure the side payments and adjust salaries accordingly.
Our sales manager would like to use v and w to adjust the compensation to U and D. In
particular, he must change v so that U gets enough additional compensation to pay s (otherwise U will
quit) and he must change w so that D's compensation is reduced by s (otherwise he is paying D more
than the market wage). However, in adjusting v and w the sales manager wants to be able to achieve
the desired u and d, that is, he wants as much profit from the new system as he earned with the old.
All of this must happen with the agents acting in their own best interests. The following result says
simply that the sales manager can choose the appropriate v and w. The result is reasonably general.
It holds for fairly general concave profit, cost, and reward functions. The non-side-payment reward
systems can be profit maximizing, but they need not be.
RESULT 2. If the firm can preclude side payments and choose a reward system, v and w, such that
the upstream and downstream agents, acting in their own best interests, choose actions u" and d',
then there exists a reward system such that (1) there is no loss of profits to the firm and (2) the
upstream and downstream agents, still acting in their own best interests, choose u" and d' even
though they are free to make side payments in return for higher ratings.
The basic proof follows the intuition of the sales force example. The modified reward system
changes the slopes of v and w with respect to r to achieve the new equilibrium implied by side
payments. The change in the slope of v offsets the cost of the side payment to U and the change in
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the slope of w reduces D's rewards accordingly. Together these changes do not affect the first-order
conditions for u and d nor do they add any risk. (Recall that the rating is given before the noisy
outcome, i, is observed. Thus, the change in the rating imposes no new risks to either U or D.)
Practical Internal Ratings Systems (which allow Side Payments)
Result 2 answers the sales manager's second question, but not his third question. Result 2
guarantees that a rating system can be found, not that it is practical. Assuming the sales manager
already knows how to set base salaries and sales commissions, we want to know whether the slopes
of v and w can be set by practical methods.
Ratings systems do exist (e.g., Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1990, Chester 1995, and
Shapira and Globerson 1983, and our own experience) so some must be practical. They have
survived the market test, so they must provide reasonable profits. More formally, Hauser, Simester,
and Wernerfelt (1996) provide two examples of practical internal customer ratings systems -- a linear
variable outcome-based system and a quadratic target-value system. In both systems the firm's profits
are robust with respect to the slopes of v and w. These systems are practical because the slopes can
be set by judgment or by trial and error with little loss of profit (versus optimal slopes). Thus, the
challenge of setting the slopes of v and w seems to be comparable to the challenge of setting base
salaries and sales commissions.
However, the simple rating systems do not always handle risk optimally. Result 2 gives the
sales manager confidence to begin with easy-to-implement systems and then tinker with more
complex systems in the pursuit of higher overall profits. He knows that the side payments introduced
by more complex systems need not decrease profits.
Implicit Ratings
To illustrate implicit ratings, we use another (hypothetical) example. Suppose that a large
firm uses a wholly owned internal travel service. This service might include a fleet of private planes
and vans for executives who must travel site to site. Suppose that this firm tracks the number of
executive trips (perhaps weighted by distance and type of vehicle) and the total cost of providing the
travel service. It evaluates and rewards the internal travel service based on the number of trips. If
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the internal travel service is the upstream agent (U) and the executives are the downstream agent (D),
then the number of trips acts like an implicit rating, r. (For the purposes of this illustration ignore
any free-riding within divisions.) Specifically, the rewards to the internal travel service (U) are
increasing in the number of trips (r) and the rewards to the executives are decreasing in the number
of trips. (Presumably more trips are more onerous to the executives.) Mathematically we now have
the same structure as that for the explicit ratings except that profits may depend upon the number of
trips above and beyond the efforts of U and D. Even when the profit function depends explicitly on
the implicit rating, e.g., r(u,d,r), the analogs of Results 1 and 2 hold. (See appendix.) The internal
travel service will (most likely) offer side payments for increased business travel and the firm can
choose a reward system so that the side payments do not lower profits.
Are Side Payments Ever Efficient?
Side payments within a firm might be attractive to the firm if the upstream agent can
compensate the downstream agent more efficiently than the firm. For example, if the internal travel
service faces a peak-loading problem, it will have excess capacity during off-peak hours. The
marginal cost of providing transportation during these evening, weekend, or vacation times might be
relatively low. If the travel service is efficient, then the cost of providing this travel might be less
than the traveler could otherwise obtain. The firm might find it attractive to allow the internal travel
service to compensate employees with an internal frequent flyer program. Further efficiencies result
when this benefit is not taxed (e.g., Peterson 1996).
We can get an idea of the magnitude of internal travel costs by examining data on external
travel services. TWA estimates that the average cost of a frequent flyer trip is $28, considerably less
than the traveler would pay for a comparable flight (Peterson 1996). To estimate the value to the
traveler, we examine firms which reimburse employees who use frequent flyer tickets for business
travel. Presumably the value to the flyer is at least this large. For example, one large real estate
development firm reimburses its employees when they use (personal) frequent flyer miles for business
travel. The reimbursement is the price of the least expensive commercial ticket. This is clearly above
$28. 5 If these numbers are representative, the value to D appears to exceed the cost to U.
5 Personal discussions with an employee from that firm. His most recent transaction was a $535 reimbursement.
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Side Payments Across Firm Boundaries
It is tempting to apply our results to commercial frequent flyer programs. Not only are they
a pervasive marketing program in the airline industry (Boston Globe, March 13, 1994), but credit card
companies, long distance telephone companies, and electric utilities now offer frequent flyer miles.
(The market price that airlines charge these firms is currently 2 per mile.) By defining the number
of trips (appropriately weighted) as an implicit rating, we get a related formal structure -- but with
one critical difference. The flyer's firm no longer can announce v(r) because the price that an airline
receives for a trip is set by the market.6 Result 1 still holds because it applies for any v(r) under
which the firm chooses to operate. However, Result 2 no longer guarantees that the firm can choose
a reward system that allows side payments and does not hurt profits. Technically, Result 2 still says
that v and w exist such that profits are not decreased. However, because a single firm no longer
controls v and w, there is no easy mechanism with which a single firm can set v and w such that
profits do not decrease. The efficiency gains of frequent flyer programs may or may not offset their
costs to the airline or to the flyer's firm. Similar comments apply to sales perquisites and related
marketing side payments across firm boundaries. Reward functions exist, but the firm(s) may be
unable to select them.
Summary
Side payments are common in marketing. Our analysis suggests that this should not be
surprising because (1) the structure of intrafirm upstream-downstream ratings systems often guarantees
that there are economic incentives for side payments and (2) if the firm can control the reward
functions it can always factor the side payments into the compensation system with no loss of profits.
These results hold even if the rating is implicit. Side payments may not occur if the rating is
constrained appropriately (Result 1) or if the firm or society uses peer pressure, cultural norms, or
punishment to prevent side payments. When side payments are made across firm boundaries, a single
firm may not have sufficient control of the reward functions to factor out side payments.
6If the firm is sufficiently large relative to the market it might approach a monopsony and, in some formal games,
control the price. For example, the US military receives special (lower) fares from the airlines.
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We hope that the ideas of this paper apply to other marketing situations and generalize beyond
marketing. For example, in Wernerfelt, Simester, and Hauser (1996) we use related concepts to
analyze side payments between supervisors and those who are supervised.
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SIDE PAYMENTS IN MARKETING, APPENDIX
Appendix: Formal Proofs (To be made available from the authors, September 1996.)
RESULT 1. For incentive systems in which the rewards to the upstream agent are increasing in the
downstream agent's rating, the upstream agent will provide a positive side payment to the downstream
agent unless the firm sets a binding upper bound on the rating (or otherwise precludes side payments).
Even with a binding upper bound, there may be side payments.
Proof. Consider a given u. Letf(e) be the density function for e. Consider first the case where there is
no upper bound on r or it is not binding. U will seek to maximize the expression in Equation 4 subject
to the conditions imposed by D's maximization problems in Equation 3. Let rF=v-c%-s. Differentiating
Equation 4 we obtain:
auu a[v(r-cu(u)-s(u,r)
J-~--- a ffte)de = 0ar, af
By assumption, auaru>o. The error, e, appears in w, but it does not appear in v, c,, or s. Thus, this
integral can be zero if and only if aU,,[v-c,,-s]/ar=O. Thus, this first order condition holds if only if:
(Al) av(r) _ s(u,r) 0
ar af
Let r,=w-cd+s. We now use implicit differentiation on Equation 3 recognizing that the right-hand side
(RHS) does not depend on .
(A2) a U ard w( ,) a rd as r ) e)de = 0aw a as a
By assumption aU/Jard, which depends on e, is positive. Furthermore, s(u,r) does not depend upon k, and
arJaw=aras=l. Hence, Equation A2 becomes:
(A3) Jarda? f(e)de u= ) a- e)de
f r a alp - ar 
From Al we have as(r,u)/ar=av(r)/ar. But av(r)/ar>o by assumption. Thus, the RHS of A3 is negative:
(A4 J r) e)de O(A4) jLd aW(n)
By similar arguments we use implicit differentiation on Equation 3 to obtain.
(A5) j r S e)de = 
Finally, we differentiate the left-hand side (LHS) of A4 or A5 to demonstrate that the second derivative
with respect to r is negative (concave) because auaar,>o and a2w/ar<O. Thus, we have shown that the
first derivative of a concave function is negative at and zero at . Hence, r>?. The side payment is
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positive by Equation 3. In the case where r is constrained, we add a Lagrange multiplier, -(r-i), to U's
optimization problem. This might allow a solution of the form av/da = X and as/ar = 0. If u were limited
to a finite set, we obtain a result similar to that for Lagrange multipliers by using a series of piecewise
functions for w such that each piece corresponds to a different action by U. Finally, the reader can verify
side payments for v=vo+vr and w=wo+w,(1-r)+w3rir for sE[O, 1] and sufficiently large v, and w,..
RESULT 2. If the firm can preclude side payments and choose a reward system, v and w, such that the
upstream and downstream agents, acting in their own best interests, choose actions u° and d', then there
exists a reward system such that (1) there is no loss of profits to the firm and (2) the upstream and
downstream agents, still acting in their own best interests, choose u" and d' even though they are free to
make side payments in return for higher ratings.
Proof. We prove the theorem for any implementable actions, u° and d'. We begin with interior solutions
for r. Let v"(r) and w"(r,7i) implement u" and d' without side payments. (7r°, c are shorthand for 7c(u°,d')
and c(Xd'), respectively. Define rd° = w"(r, r)-cd(d) and r,, = v"(r)-c,(u").) Then r, u°, and d' satisfy the
following first order conditions.
aEUd =;a d ard °a(r,' 0) e)de = 0
ar f awo ar
aEUd a aU d aw (r o, ot) an(u,d°) + rd acd (d 0°)
ad c J o an ad ace ad 0
aE au ar (r 0) r are acu(u 0) oo)
au )j _ te)de = 0au lzaru av0 8r au ac, au
At this point we could continue to track through all the integral expectations as we did in the proof to
Result 1. However, this notational nightmare adds no new insight to the basic proof. (Our proof
demonstrates that two sets of first-order conditions lead to the same u" and d'. With the integrals, these
first-order conditions are still equal. Thus we work with the terms in the brackets. This would be exact
if the error, e, were additive to w rather than to r. For the more sophisticated reader, we provide a
supplemental appendix that contains an alternative proof with the integrals. In addition, that proof allows
7r to be a function of r. This generalization is described in the text. Since araw=-ardacC=ar/av=-
ar,/ac,=l, the simplified first-order conditions reduce to:
(A6) aw(r° 0 ) 0
ar
(A7) ow°(r°0, ) a(u°,d°) aCd(d) 0
an cad ad
(A8) av (r ) ar aCu (u°0)
ar au au
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Now allow side payments and select new reward functions, w(r, 7r) = w"(r,7r) -cer+v"(r °) and v(r) = acr.
Recall that the firm must reimburse U and D for their risk costs because ir contains noise and both U and
D are risk averse. Under the specified reward system (for no side payments) only D incurs risk due to
w"(r, ir). Because the noise does not affect r, the only risk that D will incur under the new reward system
is still due to w°(r, r). Thus, if the new reward system implements v", d, r", then the cost of risk will be
the same for D and hence for the firm which must reimburse D for that risk. Now, we must only prove
that an ao can be chosen such that the new reward functions implement u", d', and r' when side payments
are allowed.
For a given u, without a side payment, D would maximize the RHS of Equation 3. After
simplification similar to that used to derive Equations A6-A8, d(u") and ?(u) are defined by the following.
(f is shorthand for 7r(u",d).)
(A9) ar -
(A IJ0) *aw°(V,) a(uo,d) ac(d) = 0
an ad ad
For a given u", with a side payment contract (s, r), D will choose d to maximize the LHS of
Equation 3. After simplifying we obtain ( is shorthand for 7r(id).)
(All) `w°(,i) ag(i,) acd(d) 
an ad ad
If = u" and = r", then Equation A11 is the same as Equation A7 implying d = d'.
Now U chooses , , and s to maximize Equation 4 subject to Equation 3. Use the definition of
rd and r,, from the proof to Result 1. We first differentiate Equation 4 and simplify (review Al).
(A12) a - =0
ar
(A 13) a ) 0
au au
We use implicit differentiation on Equation 3. (U will choose s such that Equation 3 is binding. The
RHS is not a function of r.) After simplification (review A2--A3):
(A 14) w °(F, +) a = 
ar dr
Substituting Equation A12 into Equation A14 yields Equation A4 thus if i=u", then =r" because d=d'
whenever i=u" and r=r". We must now show that we can choose ca such that i=u".
We begin by implicitly differentiating Equation 3 with respect to u. After extensive simplification
this becomes Equation A15. (We use the first-order conditions in Equations A7, A9, and A14 to eliminate
many terms by the envelop theorem and we use Equation A13 to substitute as/au = -ac,(i)/au.)
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(A15) U a (d)e)de - faudfe)d u &- w (-d)(q /e)de
. a au au W- ard -- a adu
We must now demonstrate that we can choose an a such Equation A15 holds when the participation
constraints hold. (We first replace v(s") with K(a) such that the participation constraints hold.) Let us
fix i=u" and r=r", then only the RHS of equation A15 varies as a varies. First consider a=O. When (=O,
u=u°, and =r", then ?=r ° and d=d' by Equations A9 and AIO which become the same as A6 and A7.
Because the participation constraints hold, d=Ird, thus the term on the RHS of equation A15 is the same
as the first term on the LHS of Equation A15. Since adUar>O and ac,/au>O, this implies that for
Equation A15 we have LHS < RHS.
Continue to fix =u" and ~=r' and let a-oo. We use the implicit function theorem on Equations
A9 and A10 (differentiating with respect to a) to obtain:
(A16) {n , ( [ a2(at + V _d ar2 = d a
ar2 ad aran a ad2 ad2j aa
By the assumptions of the text, the term in the large brackets, {}, is negative, thus al/aa<O. Because the
second partials are bounded from zero, this implies that --_oo as a-.Xoo. Then, because a[aw"/ar]/r is
bounded from zero, we have aw"(r, r)/ar-co. Hence, for -oo in Equation A15 we have LHS > RHS.
Finally, Equations A9 and AIO tell us that the change with respect to ac is continuous, thus there must be
an ct between 0 and oo such that for Equation A15 LHS = RHS for ii=u".
To summarize, we have proven that an ca>0 exists such that Equation A15 is satisfied. Thus, ii,
d, and r must satisfy Equations A6-A8 hence ii=u°, d=d', r=r" for w(r, 7r) = w"(r, 7r) - r + v'(r"), and
side payments are allowed. The proof for constrained r requires that we introduce Lagrange multipliers
in Equations A6, A8, A9, A12, and A14. This does not affect the arguments for r=r" and d=d'. We then
use the new A9 and A14 to simplify for Equation A15 and the rest of the proof follows. 
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In the appendix to "Side Payments in Marketing" we provided an abridged proof to Result 2. The
proof was abridged because we did not carry through all of the integrals associated with expected utilities
and we did not make r an explicit function of r. Most readers will find that proof easier to follow. In this
supplemental appendix we provide an alternative proof to Result 2. In this proof we carry through all the
integrals and we make r an explicit function of r. In addition, for brevity, we make greater use of agency
theory vocabulary and we leave a few algebraic details to the reader. Finally, we generalize the result to
more general utility functions.
RESULT 2. If the firm can preclude side payments and choose a reward system, v and w, such that the
upstream and downstream agents, acting in their own best interests, choose actions u° and d', then there
exists a reward system such that (1) there is no loss of orofits to the firm and (2) the upstream and
downstream agents, still acting in their own best interests, choose u° and d' even though they are free to
make side payments in return for higher ratings.
Proof. Let us first denote the game in which the firm precludes side payments by G' and the game in
which side payments are allowed as G'. Formally, we show that if (v°,w °) implement (u°,do,r) in G,
and the participation constraints bind, then there exist real numbers Y,0,0 d such that
(v',w')=(o.s5y 2+yr+O, wo-0.5y2 -yr+0d) leads to U and D choosing (u°,d,Pr) in G' at the same
expected cost to the firm.'
We first generalize the reward and cost functions for the upstream and downstream agents as:
Uu = Uu(x,u) and Ud = Ud(y,d) where the first argument in each function represents the money transfers
resulting from the side payments and wage payments and the second argument reflects the disutility of
effort. 2
Note that under the new reward system only D incurs risk and this risk is due to w° (as under
the old reward system). Hence, the risk premium paid by the firm will be unchanged if we implement
(u°,d',r°) in G'. Moreover, if we can implement (u,d`,r) in G', we can adjust u,0ld until both
participation constraints bind. Therefore, we need only show that we can choose y to implement
(u°,d,r") in G' with (o.5y 2+yr+0,, w°-o.5y'-yr+Od). To do so we first show that if we can
implement u° and d with (o.5sy2 +yr+0,, wo-o.5y '- yr+0d) then, when the participation constraints are
binding, we will also implement r. Next we show that if we can implement u° and r with
(0.5y 2+yr+0,, w°-o.5y 2-yr+Od) then, when the participation constraints are binding, we will also
implement d. Finally we show that we can choose a y so that (o.5y 2+yr+0 u, w-o.5y2 '-yr+od)
implements u given d° and r°.
Note that r is determined by D in G from the following first order condition:
'Note that we will assume that w" satisfies the same assumptions as w and that utility is strictly increasing
in monetary payments (with the slope bounded away from zero). Finally we also require that V d 7: is increasing in
u when u=u°, and that the integrals overf(e) are defined correctly. These are all rather weak (and natural)
assumptions.
2That is: x=v-s and y=w+s.
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aud aw a aw 
ay an ar 
= 0
r is determined by U maximizing fU,(v'-s,u) dF, which yields the following first order
f a U - s dFax ( o,) = 0
Using the implicit function theorem on (3) we get:
(SA3) ( aud au f aw aw dF)
ar y ay a ar at ay
Inserting this into (SA2) yields:
aud adw a w ]W dFY- y a ar arJ If ay dFay 
This is zero if (SA1) is zero, since all derivatives are evaluated at their participation constraints. So if
we can use (0.5y 2 +yr+0, w°-o0.52-yr+Od) to implement u and d' in G', we will also implement r.
Note that this result holds even if there is an upper bound on r that constrains in G. Although SA1
will not equal zero in those circumstances, because SA4 equals SA1 we know that the constraint will
also be binding in G'.
We turn now to implementation of d>, and make the analogous argument that if (o.5y 2 + yr+ O.,
w°-o.sy 2-yr++d) implement u° and K in G', we will also implement d°. Note that d' is determined by
D in G" from the following first order condition:
(SA5) aUd, aw an Uday~ adF + f -a.dFfy ay ad ad = 0
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(SA6)
faUd( aw 0 a d) f UddFJ _y a _d dF + dF
-y5/ ad dad = 0
This is zero if (SA5) is zero since all derivatives are again evaluated at their participation constraints.
So we now need only show that we can find a y that implements u using (0.5y2 +yr+O,,
w°-o.5sy2-yr+Od). Under G', u is determined by U maximizing JU, (v'-s,u) dF, which (using the





a, i aaw a aul
au a|d - - dF -|





-u dF au+ au= 
au
a = (w'(u°,d,)-s,d)
b = (w'(uo,d, ),d)
again that we fix u°, d° and r° and use ,, 0 d to ensure that the participation constraints remain
does there exist a y such that (SA7) holds?
Under these constraints, only the second aw term changes as we change y. On the
ax du
other hand (6) tells us that the change is continuous. Suppose first that y=0. In this case, s=0, =r"
au
and d=d' so the left side of (SA7) reduces to - < . Consider next what happens as y-o. Using
ad
the implicit function theorem on (6), we see that d_ is negative iff:dy
ay [ as ar adr ay
We would like to show that ---o as y-oo (we assume that D's threat point P has no lower
bound). Let us assume, to derive a contradiction that this is not the case. This implies that (SA8) is
not satisfied, (y + ?) > 0 and aw is increasing as y-o. Note that because w° and Tz are concave in
an
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aw[ a + aw < . Thus we have derived a contradiction because if
an ar 8r ]
[aw a a+ w < and (y + )> then both terms in Equation (SA8) are positive as y-.
Hence we know that --- as y--. Since by assumption aw _ - as a--g, this will eventually
an
make the left side of (SA7) positive. So by continuity there exists a y such that (SA7) holds and this y
implements u°.
